Hassan777 wrote: Mon May 25, 2020 3:51 pm
Note the sudden drop in the airspeed while altitude Is close to zero probably thats where the engines hit the ground,although their approach speeds seem under the 260 knot limit of landing gear deployment so the chime heard might not be the landing gear speed limit chime like many people thought.
Shahab wrote: Mon May 25, 2020 4:09 pm
Can anyone please confirm the accuracy of IAS data provided by flightradar. If there is a tolerance in the calculations, the chimes may well be because of the high air speed landing gear issue.
Interesting - that will certainly warrant further analysis.
One word of caution - the data from the 14 different receivers isn't synchronised, as they all seem to be running different clocks, hence there is a lot of spurious jitter when you try to plot time series. So you get, for example, TAS jumping from 374 kts to 400 kts with timestamps only half a second apart.
But that's not an insurmountable problem, it should be possible to deduce the relative time offsets that should be applied to the data from respective receivers and produce a more accurate plot.
As others have said, this accident is looking increasingly bizarre.
Cognitive overload; distraction; task fixation, and sense of urgency. With a suhoor time of 3:30ish and a blocks off of 13:00, we're looking at 5-6 hours of sleep before waking up and heading to duty. Calculate the total flying times and turnaround times, they would have been back just for iftar.
The report and CVR transcripts will be fascinating, although will there actually be anything to learn...? It is very easy to ask "Why on earth did they do this or that?" However, what you have to ask is "With the situation they were in, and the information they had, why did they think what they were doing was correct?"
One way of operating an aircraft safely is to have a briefing at a sensible period of low workload, in which the crew openly and cooperatively discuss the approach, the threats to be faced, the required performance of the aircraft, how the aircraft is to be operated and what modes/level of automation to be used, and a number of check points during the approach where the profile can be measured against planned. This can then be used as decision points as to whether it is safe and sensible to continue the approach, or whether the configuration of the aircraft should be changed or any other changes are required. Ultimately, towards the end, let's say 1000 feet (not sure of PIA's sop) both pilots must ensure that if the aircraft is not on the centre line and prescribed glide path, with the speed stable and close to target and the engines at approach thrust - a go around shall be flown.
Some occupants of some aircraft flight decks may use different methods or no methods at all to achieve different outcomes. The reported reluctance to accept lower FLs from ATC adds another puzzle factor ... WHY stay high, when the procedures say descend? Hearing the Conversation between approach controller & PM it was approach controller asking if “Belly landing” is what they are performing. This makes me think the controller was aware of an abnormality, or had seen it, or was told by colleagues. IF, and this is a big IF, they had visual, shouldn't they have warned the crew about their gear not being down? Secondly, IF they did see engine sparks/visible smoke and had the chance to ask "belly landing", did they advise the crew sir you appear to be spewing smoke out your engines. And, now fully knowing that this was an abnormal situation, what was the sense in turning them to a heading of 110 AWAY from the airfield, instead of a tight downwind on 074? The fact is that this direction added extra flight time to the 2nd approach, valuable time that could have ended up in a different result.
Another point I feel may be significant, and perhaps the A320 folks can explain better: a photo taken (reportedly) at crosswind shows no flaps or slats. Would anyone care to point out the significance if any?
There is very, very rarely a single, one-and-only root cause: that is simplistic. Instead, there are a plethora of human, mechanical, organisational, managerial and cultural issues that on one unhappy day or night all come together (cf John Reason's Swiss Cheese model). An investigation that fails to dig deep into the cause-behind-the-cause-behind-the-cause is unlikely to reveal the full picture and thus prevent re-occurrence.
Yesterday, I did some research on the recent major air disasters in Pakistan. I quote the final reports from the CAA/excerpts available on the net:
- PIA Fokker at Multan: CRM, pilot's failure to raise landing gear & follow SOP
- Airblue at Islamabad: CRM, pilots' failure to understand autopilot system
- Bhoja at Islamabad: Lack of proper training on the aircraft, pilot's failure to follow SOP & to understand autopilot system
- JS air at Karachi: Mx, "Failure of captain to handle abnormal operation....and of FO to execute necessary measures"
- PIA at Havelian: Mx related
- PIA at Gilgit: never made public, but anyone can read the info on this forum.
See a common theme emerging?
Let's also hit upon the steep authority gradient between pilots vs ATC. Lack of exposure, lack of proper training, lack of any real authority, and the threat of "the captain will get me fired" leaves many more silent than they should be. Is there any real incident reporting system in place for ATCs? I know there is one on paper, but is it actually used? Would the pilots at PIA like to explain why they had their inhouse safety magazine discontinued? Would anyone from the PIA community like to share their Whatsapp conversations with reference to this case & palpa's "political power"?
This sense of being above the law needs to change, fast, and the airline, the regulator, and the ministry are all at fault for not making examples out of every single one - sweeper, baggage loader, engineer, cabin crew, pilot or director - who violates SOPs.
oozeman64 wrote: Mon May 25, 2020 5:21 pm
You're right approach doesnt give landing clearences, but i have spoken to the captain of an a320 and he has told me that at least on one occasion, he was cleared to land before being handed over to tower.
Although this could be an isolated incident.
This doesn't really help us in the PK8303 accident but it may show us that SOPs aren't strictly adhered to by ATC.
I've heard this multiple times at different airports in Pakistan, perhaps someone with better knowledge can add the justification.
Flyer1015 wrote: Mon May 25, 2020 8:15 pm
As usual, they'll blame the dead pilots and move on with no changes. Then within 5 yrs another major fatal plane crash will happen in Pakistan and people will write it off as kismet. Pakistan needs change, top to bottom, in the civil aviation industry. Safarish needs to go away, need merit based positions, a good Safety Management System (SMS), a FOQA data system, and a LOSA system. If Pakistan has 500 flights per month, how many of those flights do CAA inspectors jumpseat in the flight deck for observation? How do you know how many approaches are unstable at PIA? Unless you have a QAR or FOQA system there is no way to track that. Even flight deck observations by the CAA would help track some data. Look at the safety systems in the United States, the safety record of aviation in the US, and learn from it. Pakistan should adopt best safety practices of countries like the US and UK.
But as usual, 2 dead pilots will be blamed for this crash without examining the entire system that put them in that position on that day. Change the system, you change the future for aviation safety. Blame 2 dead pilots, you don't change anything. They'll probably sacrifice a goat on the ramp at Lahore and go about their business, just as they did after the ATR crash.
The sad part is the systems are there - just no one to implement and a strong "buddy" system ensures nothing improper ever sees the light of day. Expect the typical knee-jerk reaction, and the storm will blow over when something else becomes viral on social media. My question to respected members who have inside knowledge of PIA: WOuld anyone like to share if the PF/PM continuing an unstable approach below 1000' without any extenuating circumstances, are penalized? At my parent company, first incident is warning letter, second is straight termination - no questions asked. Also, I'd love to hear what internal actions were taken on PK786 (Feb 20th incident).
Hassan777 wrote: Mon May 25, 2020 8:30 pm
Even if you read previous AAIB reports on ABQ 202 and NL 142 they had a long list of recommendations for the airlines, pilot and CAA and I don’t think they have even remotely tried to enforce them, this just shows the carelessness throughout the industry and it’s really sad, no one takes the blame here even after both Air blue crash and shaheen crash landing
unions were really up for the investigation especially PALPA but when in both cases pilots were at fault among other things they rejected them and called them biased , This just shows how no one wants to change, Associations like PALPA and SEAP can make there members think a hundred times before slacking off.
Such an important point to note. I'm certain by now PALPA have done a press conference and committed to ensuring safety of passengers no matter what. They must also have committed to enhancing training, practicing multiple failures in training, and adopting SOPs, or their big announcement must be just around the corner.
@faisal-777, @oozeman64, @ flyingsystem reasonable points. @daniyal 07, and yet despite all the poor engineering, in the above list of crashes I quoted, maintenance is fully implicated only in one, but another factor has been quoted a lot more.
