Combination of errors cited for Fokker crash

[FULLTHRUST]

The article Abbas posted above read that the pilots didn't have the knowledge or lacked the recurrent training to deal with such a problem - this is really hard to believe!

What do you do if you feather the running engine by mistake?

[ConnieMan]

Here is something of interest...

http://www.flightglobal.com/articles/20 ... er-on.html

Wondering why prop would be feathered in flight!, off course even if engine is running feathered prop is produce no thrust and plane is deemed to lose altitude!...Looks as left engine and prop to me, and not right one that has been claimed to gained problems before taking off..

[Adnaan786]

The article Abbas posted above read that the pilots didn't have the knowledge or lacked the recurrent training to deal with such a problem - this is really hard to believe!

What do you do if you feather the running engine by mistake?

Is that official infromation?

[Abbas Ali]

Since AP-BAL tragedy I have gathered following information from different news items & magazine articles.

• A PIA Fokker F-27 flight from Islamabad under the command of Capt. Hamid landed at Lahore Airport on July 9, 2006 around 11:15PM. From the airport, a PIA van took Capt. Hamid to Pearl Continental Hotel-Lahore. The van reached hotel around 11:45PM.

• The captain who was to fly PK-687/688 on July 10 had submitted sick report and was unavailable. On July 10, around 12:00AM Flight scheduling contacted Capt. Nadeem Chaudhry in Karachi and requested him to operate flight PK-687/688 on July 10 morning. Capt. Nadeem was not scheduled to operate any flight on July 10 and on behalf of PIA he was to conduct someone's ground check at Karachi on July 10. Flight scheduling told Capt. Nadeem to be on standby and be ready to reach Lahore by PIA night coach if flight scheduling are unable to find any captain to command July 10 flight PK-687/688.

• Around 12:30AM on July 10, 2006, Flight Scheduling department called Capt. Hamid in his hotel room and requested him to operate morning’s Fokker F-27 flight PK-687 to Multan and then fly it back from Multan to Lahore as flight PK-688. Capt. Hamid agreed to operate the flight. Later, around 12:35AM, flight scheduling informed Capt. Nadeem in Karachi that they have made arrangement for the captain (Capt. Hamid) to operate flight PK-687/688.

• 53-year-old Capt. Hamid had completed ten hours duty after operating F-27 flights for two days and he should have been allowed 20 hours rest before operating another flight (rest time is duty hours' double). Apparently Capt. Hamid didn’t get more than 4 or 5 hours sleep when on July 10 morning he was picked up from Pearl Continental Hotel around 8:00AM in the morning and from there he reached Lahore Airport around 8:45AM. The scheduled departure time of flight PK-687 was 9:35AM but flight scheduling delayed departure time by 30 minutes. PK-687 under the command of Capt. Hamid took off from Lahore for Multan around 10:05AM.

• Flight PK-687 from Lahore landed at Multan Airport around 11:20AM. It was hot day in Multan. 36 degrees centigrade temperature was entered in trim sheet for flight PK-688 from Multan to Lahore. The actual temperature in Multan at that time was 40-45 degrees centigrade. So, wrong temperature was entered in trim sheet.

• Aircraft was overloaded at Multan Airport. Maximum allowed cargo weight was entered in flight PK-688 trim sheet (exact weight figures not clear).

• Flap setting for take-off was not correct. It was not according to outside temperature & weight of the aircraft. Flap setting should have been 16.5 degrees but the ill-fated aircraft took off with zero degree flap setting. Correct flap setting would have given the aircraft more lift during the take-off.

• Around 12:05PM the ill-fated Fokker F-27 (AP-BAL) started its take-off roll as flight PK-688 to Lahore. During the take-off roll engine# 2 (starboard) crossed its Turbine Gas Temperature (TGT) limit. Water Methanol was injected which ignited fire in engine# 2 and its parts began to melt and fall on runway and grass leaving burn marks on it. Injection of Water Methanol was late, it should have been injected before the engine gained full power.

• When an engine is overheated it’s feathered automatically or manually. With one engine in feathered position the other engine gains full power (hi-lock?). In AP-BAL’s wreckage photos engine# 2 looks like it was rotating when it struck ground while engine# 1 appears feathered (That’s what I tried to point out in topic PIA Fokker (AP-BAL) crash investigation thread in my post on July 12, 2006), it’s not clear whether it was feathered automatically or manually by the crew.

• The aircraft took off after covering 4000 feet of runway. Take-off could have been aborted, the aircraft would have come to rest in plain field at the end of runway with no or lesser number of casualties.

• Landing gear not retracted, contributed to drag.

• AP-BAL didn’t gain height of more than 500-700 feet and crashed within 50 seconds after take-off. The aircraft’s belly struck mango trees at the height of about 22 feet.

• The two pilots had few flying hours on F-27. Capt. Hamid had accumulated 25 flying hours as F-27 Captain. First Officer Abrar Chughtai had accumulated 350 flying hours as F-27 First Officer. One of the two pilots on ill-fated PK-688 should have been more experienced. On any flight with less experienced Captain there should be more experienced First Officer. Similarly with less experienced First Officer there should be more experienced Captain.

[ConnieMan]

So from Abbas Bahi's post it shows that initial problem started with wrong temp of that day stated on the sheets and there fore Late Capt. Hamid did not knew what setting to set on the aircraft, (Was this act of sabotage by ground crew/personal or honest mistake) then secondly he didn't knew his aircraft was over loaded and he didn't set correct amount of takeoff flap degrees!,(Why didn't his papers showed right figures from flight planner) now this doesn't make sense here, why didn't he used flap at all!, thirdly when #2 engine starting to act up he must have got indications in the cockpit, then why did he continued to proceed with with take off roll and not abort the take off instead!, forth and most important shouldn't he knew he only had 4-5 hours of sleep and he couldn't operate flight with lack of sleep!!, it's obvious that he was very tired to operate that flight and must have been pressurized and forced by PIA scheduler to operate this doomed flight that day!....Looks as he didn't follow some key procedure points and went with his instincts instead, it also sounds as combination of errors that took place that day on that ill-fated flight, starting from wrong day temp, pilot given wrong figures of his aircraft weight stated on the flight plan by flight planner and his(pilot's) errors with following procedure correctly.

[Adnaan786]

Since AP-BAL tragedy I have gathered following information from different news items & magazine articles.

• A PIA Fokker F-27 flight from Islamabad under the command of Capt. Hamid landed at Lahore Airport on July 9, 2006 around 11:15PM. From the airport, a PIA van took Capt. Hamid to Pearl Continental Hotel-Lahore. The van reached hotel around 11:45PM.

• The captain who was to fly PK-687/688 on July 10 had submitted sick report and was unavailable. On July 10, around 12:00AM Flight scheduling contacted Capt. Nadeem Chaudhry in Karachi and requested him to operate flight PK-687/688 on July 10 morning. Capt. Nadeem was not scheduled to operate any flight on July 10 and on behalf of PIA he was to conduct someone's ground check at Karachi on July 10. Flight scheduling told Capt. Nadeem to be on standby and be ready to reach Lahore by PIA night coach if flight scheduling are unable to find any captain to command July 10 flight PK-687/688.

• Around 12:30AM on July 10, 2006, Flight Scheduling department called Capt. Hamid in his hotel room and requested him to operate morning’s Fokker F-27 flight PK-687 to Multan and then fly it back from Multan to Lahore as flight PK-688. Capt. Hamid agreed to operate the flight. Later, around 12:35AM, flight scheduling informed Capt. Nadeem in Karachi that they have made arrangement for the captain (Capt. Hamid) to operate flight PK-687/688.

• 53-year-old Capt. Hamid had completed ten hours duty after operating F-27 flights for two days and he should have been allowed 20 hours rest before operating another flight (rest time is duty hours' double). Apparently Capt. Hamid didn’t get more than 4 or 5 hours sleep when on July 10 morning he was picked up from Pearl Continental Hotel around 8:00AM in the morning and from there he reached Lahore Airport around 8:45AM. The scheduled departure time of flight PK-687 was 9:35AM but flight scheduling delayed departure time by 30 minutes. PK-687 under the command of Capt. Hamid took off from Lahore for Multan around 10:05AM.

• Flight PK-687 from Lahore landed at Multan Airport around 11:20AM. It was hot day in Multan. 36 degrees centigrade temperature was entered in trim sheet for flight PK-688 from Multan to Lahore. The actual temperature in Multan at that time was 40-45 degrees centigrade. So, wrong temperature was entered in trim sheet.

• Aircraft was overloaded at Multan Airport. Maximum allowed cargo weight was entered in flight PK-688 trim sheet (exact weight figures not clear).

• Flap setting for take-off was not correct. It was not according to outside temperature & weight of the aircraft. Flap setting should have been 16.5 degrees but the ill-fated aircraft took off with zero degree flap setting. Correct flap setting would have given the aircraft more lift during the take-off.

• Around 12:05PM the ill-fated Fokker F-27 (AP-BAL) started its take-off roll as flight PK-688 to Lahore. During the take-off roll engine# 2 (starboard) crossed its Turbine Gas Temperature (TGT) limit. Water Methanol was injected which ignited fire in engine# 2 and its parts began to melt and fall on runway and grass leaving burn marks on it. Injection of Water Methanol was late, it should have been injected before the engine gained full power.

• When an engine is overheated it’s feathered automatically or manually. With one engine in feathered position the other engine gains full power (hi-lock?). In AP-BAL’s wreckage photos engine# 2 looks like it was rotating when it struck ground while engine# 1 appears feathered (That’s what I tried to point out in topic PIA Fokker (AP-BAL) crash investigation thread in my post on July 12, 2006), it’s not clear whether it was feathered automatically or manually by the crew.

• The aircraft took off after covering 4000 feet of runway. Take-off could have been aborted, the aircraft would have come to rest in plain field at the end of runway with no or lesser number of casualties.

• Landing gear not retracted, contributed to drag.

• AP-BAL didn’t gain height of more than 500-700 feet and crashed within 50 seconds after take-off. The aircraft’s belly struck mango trees at the height of about 22 feet.

• The two pilots had few flying hours on F-27. Capt. Hamid had accumulated 25 flying hours as F-27 Captain. First Officer Abrar Chughtai had accumulated 350 flying hours as F-27 First Officer. One of the two pilots on ill-fated PK-688 should have been more experienced. On any flight with less experienced Captain there should be more experienced First Officer. Similarly with less experienced First Officer there should be more experienced Captain.

Wow, thank you for sharing your findings. It really was ill-fated wasn't it.

Remember, everyone makes mistakes. It's not just the pilots here to blame, from reading what Abbas has written numerous people might have prevented such an accident.

I share with you Murphy's Law: If something CAN go wrong, then it WILL go wrong.

We need to somehow have fool proof procedures to totally eliminate the possibility of something going wrong. Easier said than done.

[Noonray]

Overgrossed aircraft, hot day, overtemped engine failing at the WORST possible time - just after takeoff. What a handful for the best of pilots. (Remember the narrowest of escapes managed by Capt Naveed when a loaded up PIA A300 had an engine failing immediately after takeoff from Abu Dhabi on an even hotter, more humid summer's day some years ago?). What remains to be answered is why Captain Hamid did not cut power and land back straight ahead after getting airborne? Later why did he not crash-land in a field with some chances of survival instead of making the fatal error of trying a low speed turn back and stalling it in? Or was he going to crashland but tangled with the high-voltage cable first and just came down? Only he or copilot Abrar, God rest their souls, have the answers and we can never know.

It seems this crash was a series of unforgivable mistakes by ground staff, and the captain not managing the emergency in his worried state, all coming together with terrible consequences. Let us not attribute it to Fate please except in the most absolute terms. To me, Fate tried to prevent it but the people involved insisted to the contrary....

[R.F.]

Like the saying goes hind sight is 20/20. Contributive factors inadequate rest. The usual careless attitude of the ground staff. 36 degrees instead of 40-45 which is the norm in summers in Multan. Lower temperatures allow more payload to be carried and the usual corrupt practices of PIA check-in staff with a long list of involved individuals who take more baggage, cargo then shown and pocket the undeclared amount unabated.

With wrong flap settings instead of 16.5 zero were selected which means in order for more weight to be carried and better climb segment lower flaps are reccomended where as higher flaps give you lesser speeds on the ground meaning you have more stop distance. I guess payload restriction must have called for zero flaps settings.

What i infer from Abbass's report is that Water methanol was switched on after setting of the take -off power which in worse cases can cause the engine to burn exceeding the TGT limits.

The prop either auto feathers in the event it meets certain conditions after engine failure to cause less drag in the air or has be manually feathered which is done in any case to ensure that it has feathered,and the airplane to fly safely to meet its performance criterias especially the second segment.

The take -off was not rejected either due to the failure on the part of the crew to recorgnize the loss of power and consequently the impending fire hazard. What exactly transpired at those very crucial moments remains to be disclosed when the full details are given.

Why the crew elected to make a 180 degrees turn instead continuing straight ahead and impacting the ground that all is and will be a part of a detailed investigation. Suffice to conclude that it is indeed a tragic accident and many precious lives have been lost which could have been avoided.

[Abbas Ali]

By Umar Cheema

ISLAMABAD: The Ministry of Defence suggests the appointment of qualified persons as Pakistan International Airlines Corporation (PIAC) chairman and Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) director-general, endorsing the finding of an inquiry report which concluded that the incumbents were not competent enough to hold these positions.

“Being highly technical and complex, their (Pakistan International Airlines Corporation and Civil Aviation Authority) top managements should have adequate experience, knowledge and expertise to lead these organisations,” a summary moved to the prime minister said.

Sent by the defence secretary with the approval of the senior minister for defence, the summary also contained the report of inquiry board that probed the Fokker crash in Multan which occurred last year.

Ghazi moved the summary (Min of Def u.o. No. AT-8(4)/2006), the copy of which was made available to ‘The News’ by a source in the Prime Minister’s Secretariat. It substantiated its recommendations in the light of findings and suggestions of the inquiry board that probed into the crash of Fokker plane in Multan last year.

“The senior minister for defence has authorised the submission of the summary. Submitted for kind perusal and appropriate action as deemed necessary,” he said in his summarised note. The prime minister has, however, yet to approve the summary that raised serious questions over the appointment of the PIAC chairman and CAA DG against the criteria dictated by rules.

Notwithstanding demands made time and again by the parliament to make public the inquiry report, it has been lying pending in the Prime Minister’s Secretariat for last two months, it has been learnt.

Parliamentary Secretary for Defence Major (r) Tanvir Ahmad admitted before the National Assembly last week that his ministry wanted to make the report public but could not do so due to some ‘hurdles’.

‘The News’ sent the MoD’s observations to the PIAC chairman with its copy forwarded to the GM Public Relations, asking for comments on objections raised in the summary. The PIAC’s spokesman opted not to respond on the issue, saying that since the summary was a classified document still awaiting approval of the prime minister, hence he could not offer any comment.

Ghazi said the tragic incident was avoidable but could not due to lack of professionalism on part of the top management. He made the point in line with the suggestion of inquiry board that probed the Multan crash.

According to the summary of inquiry report, the age of Fokker aircraft had no bearing on this accident and all technical defects found in the crashed aircraft would have remained a cause of such tragic incidents in future.

A four-member inquiry board probed into the crash. The defence secretary has duly approved its findings and recommendations. President of Safety Investigation Board (SIB) Air Commodore Junaid Ameen (CAA) headed the inquiry board. Other members were Group Captain Mujahid Khan (PAF), Wing Commander (r) Naseem Ahmad (CAA) and Captain Shah Nawaz Dara (PIA).

Ghazi, in his summary note, said the tragic crash could have been avoided but the unprofessional handling of the emergency situation by the pilots resulted in loss of 45 precious lives and destruction of aircraft.

The engine failure was attributed primarily to the maintenance malpractices at engine overhaul shop of PIA during assembly process and was not detected by the PIAC Quality Engineering and Airworthiness CAA, secretary noted in the summarised findings.

The unprofessional handling of the emergency by the aircrew had its roots in the PIAC’s training/assessment, scheduling system and inadequacies in the Safety Division. It was further compounded by the poor execution of the Crew Resources Management and Human Factor Programs, the secretary said.

In his recommendations, the defence secretary said the working efficiency of quality control at PIAC Maintenance and Engineering should be improved to minimise poor maintenance and maintenance malpractices. The airworthiness directorate at CAA should enhance surveillance of Engine Overhaul Shop at PIAC Engineering. The Spectrometric Oil Analysis Program (SOAP) should be utilised for all engines, he further recommends.

A study should be carried out with a view to determine the inadequacies in flying training/assessment system, the summary recommends. Crew Resource Management (CRM) training be made meaningful with participation from cockpit crew and qualified facilitators be deployed, the recommendations said.

While scheduling, the pairing be done in a manner that at least one of the two aircrew should possess substantial experience on the type in their capacity as captain or co-pilot. PIA should institutionalise their system to study the human behaviour of aircrew with a view to pre-empt their behaviour under emergencies.

Figure of 72 kgs of weight per person used for the calculation of all up weight in the trim sheet should be reviewed. Safety Investigation Board (SIB), CAA, should be tasked to carry out a study to remove inadequacies in the issuance and renewal of ‘Certificate of Airworthiness’. Safety Division of the PIAC should be made more potent and effective by appointing flight safety specialists with substantial experience in safety programme management.

Source: MoD mantra: fly high — but on merit

[AN]

Gear not retracted is perhaps one of the biggest contributing factors to the accident, once the aircraft was airborne.

Connieman you are incorrect in your assessment of model aircraft and their aerodynamic similarities to fulls cale aircraft.

Pimary difference, and the reason you lost control of your Mitchel is that the power to weight ratio on model aircaft is significantly higher than that of transport aircaft. Depending on what you were using for power, my guess being to G25 or upwards, your power to weight is near one. wheras on a transport aircraft power to weight ratio is less than half.
This excessive power on one side causes model aircraft to be more unstable in one engine out flight than real aircraft.
The dynamics are complex as well, and the difference in reynolds numbers contributes as well, but having flown model aircraft fo 13 years, and having wone national championships, and having flown the F27, I can tell you that while the basics are the same, flying models and full scale aircaft are completely different.
It takes about 2 hours to learn to fly a model aircraft on your own. It takes alot more to fly an F27, so you are very wrong about which is hader to fly.
Most full scale pilots think it is harde to fly models as they are used to flying from within, and controlling the aircraft while watching it from outside is a different perspective. however take your average joe with no experience and put him in a cockpit or hand him a transmitter, he will learn the model faster as it is so much simpler and less complex.

[Abbas Ali]

Findings of Multan Fokker crash probe questioned

By Baqir Sajjad Syed

ISLAMABAD, Feb 25: The Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) is reported to have emerged unscathed in the Fokker crash inquiry report.

CAA Director-General Farooq Rehmatullah told Dawn that there was nothing relating to the authority in the report, which is yet to be made public by the government.

The Lahore-bound PIA Fokker F-27 flight PK-688 had crashed on July 10, 2006, minutes after taking off from Multan airport. All 45 on board were killed.

The report has concluded that a fatal combination of pilot and on-ground errors caused the incident. The on-ground factors concern engineering lapses.

Aviation experts pointed to Section 8 of the CAA’s Accident Investigation Manual, which relates to navigation and landing aids (visual and non-visual).

Different provisions of the section call for looking into aids available at the station of departure and their utilisations and effectiveness.

All air crash inquiries are conducted according to the checklist contained in the manual but certain of its clauses were said to have been skipped in the probe.

The sources said none of the radars in the country was calibrated at the time of the crash. The radars were last calibrated in September/October 2001. Subsequently, calibration was done a fortnight after the crash.

The National Assembly’s Standing Committee on Defence in its meeting on July 25 last year had asked the CAA to submit the radar calibration record but the information was not provided.

CAA’s own regulations call for checking the equipment on a regular basis for “safe operation of all traffic, which depends on the availability of radio navigational facilities”. The CAA has been claiming that the crash was not connected to calibration and that it was maintaining all navigational, communication, route and approach instruments and visual aids at all airports at an optimum level.

But aviation experts claim that the Fokker had sought radar guidance back to Multan airport when its engine caught fire and visibility was very bad. They say the faulty radar was unable to guide the aircraft properly.

Moreover, they contend, high-powered lights for guiding aircraft in bad visibility installed at Multan airport were not fit.

Pakistan Airlines Pilots Association (PALPA) chief Capt Khalid Hamza, in his comments on the reported pilot error, had questioned the competence of the inquiry team and the procedures adopted for the probe.

The sources alleged that the inquiry team ignored certain essential aspects of the investigation.

Pointing out that procedures laid down in the accident investigation manual were overlooked, the sources referred to the crash of a small aircraft at Walton airport on Sept 29 last year in which the two people on board were burnt to death because of dysfunctional fire-fighting equipment at the airport.

The Accident Investigation Manual’s Section 13 asks the investigators to inquire about the fire-fighting equipment used and its effectiveness.

Both the pilot and the other man in the aircraft were reportedly alive after the crash and trapped in the burning aircraft on ground they were screaming for help. CAA fire trucks took 12 minutes to reach the crash site on the airport premises and then it was discovered that there was no foam in the trucks.

The Safety Investigation Board did not find enough evidence to hold the CAA responsible.

In another incident in Sharjah on Nov 26, 2006, when a calibration aircraft of the CAA crashed, the SIB reportedly skipped the clause of the accident manual dealing with the qualification of pilots.

Source: DAWN

On the Net: CAA - Pakistan

Related Topic: AP-CAA crash landing at Sharjah Airport

On the Net: PALPA - Pakistan Air Line Pilots' Association

[TAILWIND]

RUBBISH

.......But aviation experts claim that the Fokker had sought radar guidance back to Multan airport when its engine caught fire and visibility was very bad. They say the faulty radar was unable to guide the aircraft properly.......

There is no radar vectoring available at Multan airport and controller follow procedure controlling in multan control zone, thus question of faulty radar or radar guidance of the ill fated Fokker does not arise.

...Moreover, they contend, high-powered lights for guiding aircraft in bad visibility installed at Multan airport were not fit.

The fokker took of from Rwy 36. After getting airborne it turned right about 30 degrees and then crashed about 1.5 miles from rwy. PAPIs are installed on rwy 36 only and not on rwy 18. For these lights to have played any role, the aircraft first has to establish it self for finals at rwy 36.

CAA fire trucks took 12 minutes to reach the crash site on the airport premises and then it was discovered that there was no foam in the trucks.

The crash site is about 1.5 miles out side the airport perimeter in the fields surrounded by populated areas. I think its an achievement if the crash vehicles reached the site in 12 minutes.

Looks there are too many armchair experts and experienced SIM pilots on this forum. or sons of PIA daddies with little or no knowledge of aviation, exceptions of course omitted.

[Abbas Ali]

Looks there are too many armchair experts and experienced SIM pilots on this forum. or sons of PIA daddies with little or no knowledge of aviation, exceptions of course omitted.

To have a discussion in friendly & peaceful atmosphere, it's better to express views without posting comments with potential to offend other members. Sometimes entire topic gets ruined by such comments.

[ConnieMan]

RUBBISH

CAA fire trucks took 12 minutes to reach the crash site on the airport premises and then it was discovered that there was no foam in the trucks.

The crash site is about 1.5 miles out side the airport perimeter in the fields surrounded by populated areas. I think its an achievement if the crash vehicles reached the site in 12 minutes.

Tailwind: This above statement was meant for Walton airport crash of small plane on Sept 29 and had nothing to do with Multan crash of Fokker that we are discussing, so seems like you got confused...

[ConnieMan]

Findings of Multan Fokker crash probe questioned

By Baqir Sajjad Syed

ISLAMABAD, Feb 25: The Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) is reported to have emerged unscathed in the Fokker crash inquiry report.

CAA Director-General Farooq Rehmatullah told Dawn that there was nothing relating to the authority in the report, which is yet to be made public by the government.

The Lahore-bound PIA Fokker F-27 flight PK-688 had crashed on July 10, 2006, minutes after taking off from Multan airport. All 45 on board were killed.

The report has concluded that a fatal combination of pilot and on-ground errors caused the incident. The on-ground factors concern engineering lapses.

Aviation experts pointed to Section 8 of the CAA’s Accident Investigation Manual, which relates to navigation and landing aids (visual and non-visual).

Different provisions of the section call for looking into aids available at the station of departure and their utilisations and effectiveness.

All air crash inquiries are conducted according to the checklist contained in the manual but certain of its clauses were said to have been skipped in the probe.

The sources said none of the radars in the country was calibrated at the time of the crash. The radars were last calibrated in September/October 2001. Subsequently, calibration was done a fortnight after the crash.

The National Assembly’s Standing Committee on Defence in its meeting on July 25 last year had asked the CAA to submit the radar calibration record but the information was not provided.

CAA’s own regulations call for checking the equipment on a regular basis for “safe operation of all traffic, which depends on the availability of radio navigational facilities”. The CAA has been claiming that the crash was not connected to calibration and that it was maintaining all navigational, communication, route and approach instruments and visual aids at all airports at an optimum level.

But aviation experts claim that the Fokker had sought radar guidance back to Multan airport when its engine caught fire and visibility was very bad. They say the faulty radar was unable to guide the aircraft properly.

Moreover, they contend, high-powered lights for guiding aircraft in bad visibility installed at Multan airport were not fit.

Pakistan Airlines Pilots Association (PALPA) chief Capt Khalid Hamza, in his comments on the reported pilot error, had questioned the competence of the inquiry team and the procedures adopted for the probe.

The sources alleged that the inquiry team ignored certain essential aspects of the investigation.

Pointing out that procedures laid down in the accident investigation manual were overlooked, the sources referred to the crash of a small aircraft at Walton airport on Sept 29 last year in which the two people on board were burnt to death because of dysfunctional fire-fighting equipment at the airport.

The Accident Investigation Manual’s Section 13 asks the investigators to inquire about the fire-fighting equipment used and its effectiveness.

Both the pilot and the other man in the aircraft were reportedly alive after the crash and trapped in the burning aircraft on ground they were screaming for help. CAA fire trucks took 12 minutes to reach the crash site on the airport premises and then it was discovered that there was no foam in the trucks.

The Safety Investigation Board did not find enough evidence to hold the CAA responsible.

In another incident in Sharjah on Nov 26, 2006, when a calibration aircraft of the CAA crashed, the SIB reportedly skipped the clause of the accident manual dealing with the qualification of pilots.

Source: DAWN

On the Net: CAA - Pakistan

Related Topic: AP-CAA crash landing at Sharjah Airport

On the Net: PALPA - Pakistan Air Line Pilots' Association

According to these findings it clearly indicates that Investigators are trying to hide actual fact/factors relating to this incident by covering themselves up and pointing blindly on other unrelated aspects in the surroundings. I doubt that we will ever get to know what really happened, the best way to find is by listening to the "Black box and cockpit voice recorders" tapes to know what actually happened in the cockpit, also to get the recording or transcripts from control tower, this will least show the communication between ground and aircraft.

Then simulate this crash scenario on PIA's Fokker simulator with actual findings/recording etc from Black box, this will give very good and precise know how as to what actually happened, these finding can me made into documentary also to give people know how as to what happened, this will be similar to NTSB documentaries of various other crashes that has happened in past ie: Gulf Air's B767 crash over Atlantic or Alasken Air's MD83's crash....